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InTroducTIon
The	cities	of	the	global	South	are	the	harbingers	of	a	new	
age.	For	the	first	time	in	history,	more	than	half	of	humanity	lives	
in	cities.1	One	billion	people	live	in	slums.2	The	vast	majority	of	
this	billion	is	 living	in	“informal”	arrangements.3	This	means	
living	without	 legally	recognized	 land	 tenure,	housing,	social	
relationships,	and	economic	livelihoods.4
Evictions	 and	 demolitions	 spring	 from	 this	 informality.	
Recourse	to	legal	protection	is	difficult	for	slum	dwellers,	since	
formal	actors	such	as	the	State	can,	and	often	do,	exploit	 this	
divide.	As	land	in	urban	settings	becomes	scarcer,5	 the	temp-
tation	for	both	public	and	private	landowners	to	evict	ordinary	
poor	people	increases.	Watchdogs	and	legal	assistance	organi-
zations	have	sprung	up	in	multitudes	to	support	slum	dwellers	
to	fight	evictions.6	They	fight	for	the	rights	of	slum	dwellers	to	
have	adequate	shelter,	basic	services,	and	other	socio-economic	
benefits.	In	countries	such	as	South	Africa,	where	the	Constitu-
tion	contains	extensive	socio-economic	rights,	a	series	of	court	
cases	in	the	past	decade	has	developed	a	method	of	defending	
the	rights	of	slum	dwellers	by	focusing	on	the	role	of	the	State.7	
The	emerging	jurisprudence	has	been	geared	primarily	towards	
compelling	the	State	to	deliver	entitlements.8
But	there	are	real	limitations	to	the	uses	of	socio-economic	
rights	 as	 a	 language	 and	 framework	 for	 development.	 Does	
enshrining	 the	right	 to	housing,	water,	health,	electricity,	and	
other	necessities,	assume	that	the	governments	bound	by	these	
obligations	will	 suddenly	be	able	 to	 fulfill	 them?	Few	would	
make	such	a	self-evidently	naïve	case.	Still,	especially	 in	 the	
urban	sector,	the	rights-based	framework	predominates.9
This	paper	will	make	three	related	arguments.	First,	legal	
and	advocacy	methods	that	hold	governments	accountable	with	
respect	to	their	socio-economic	rights	obligations	have	continu-
ing	relevance.	But	such	an	approach	has	limited	value	in	struc-
turing	mechanisms	by	which	 to	actually	deliver	entitlements.	
Secondly,	organizations	such	as	Shack	/	Slum	Dwellers	Interna-
tional	(“SDI”)	are	developing	methodologies	that	move	beyond	
a	rights-based	agenda	that	reacts	to	the	denial	of	entitlements,	to	
implement	proactive,	sustainable	alternative	solutions	to	evic-
tions,	 and	 to	 thereby	 build	 the	 foundations	 for	 participatory,	
inclusive	cities.	In	fact,	the	basic	legal	and	institutional	frame-
work	produced	by	the	rights-based	approach	has	been	a	prereq-
uisite	for	opening	the	space	for	the	alternatives	that	groups	like	
SDI	work	on.	Finally,	 there	 is	 common	ground	 among	 these	
approaches	that	can	serve	as	a	basis	for	increased	coherence	of	
purpose	and	effort	among	civil	society	actors.	In	practice,	this	
means	supporting	people-centered	processes	to	address	the	large	
problems	of	urban	human	settlements	worldwide	in	increasingly	
more	sustainable	and	scalable	ways.
The lImITaTIons oF a rIghTs-based model
The	primary	limitation	of	a	rights-based	agenda	is	that	its	
methodology	enforces	professional	control,	with	special	empha-
sis	on	that	accruing	to	lawyers	and	judges.	If	the	struggles	against	
forced	eviction,	and	for	basic	services	and	shelter—the	primary	
sites	of	socio-economic	contestation	in	the	urban	setting—are	
to	take	place	in	the	courts,	then	lawyers	inevitably	become	the	
interlocutors	of	the	poor.	This	is	true	regardless	of	whether	the	
rights-based	agenda	is	articulated	by	NGOs,	community-based	
social	movements,	or	lawyers	themselves.
Often	lawyers’	involvement	is	necessary.	The	work	that	the	
Center	for	Housing	Rights	and	Evictions	(“COHRE”),	various	
UN	agencies,	other	watchdogs,	and	legal	aid	organizations	do	
is	indispensable	for	keeping	governments	accountable	to	their	
citizens.	It	is	a	humanitarian	necessity	to	defend	the	poor	against	
State	and	private	sector	attempts	to	deny	rights	to	housing	and	
basic	services	in	urban	areas.	Many	of	these	groups	perform	key	
practical	 functions	 such	as	 strategic	 litigation,	 advocacy,	and	
documentation	of	 the	ways	in	which	governments	 throughout	
the	world	exclude	the	urban	poor	and	perpetrate	acts	of	physical,	
social,	and	economic	violence.	Housing	and	land	evictions	are	
all	too	common	in	an	age	where	urban	human	settlements	are	
clearly	the	way	of	the	future.	Because	of	the	pioneering	work	
that	these	groups	have	done	there	is	space	to	explore	alternatives	
to	evictions	and	demolitions.
shacK/slum dwellers InTernaTIonal:  
an alTernaTIve approach
SDI	is	an	alliance	of	community-based	organizations	of	the	
urban	poor	in	thirty-three	countries	in	Africa,	Asia,	and	Latin	
America.10	These	groups	use	methodologies	 that	 spring	 from	
the	most	 fundamental	 aspects	 of	 informal	 life.	Accordingly,	
all	 SDI-affiliated	 federations	 share	 a	 few	 bedrock	 practices.	
The	first	is	women-led	daily	savings	schemes	organized	at	the	
street	 level,	which	 build	financial	 and	 social	 capacity	within	
communities.	Such	a	 savings	method	allows	 these	communi-
ties	to	engage	with	formal	financial	actors	such	as	the	State	and	
banks	to	leverage	further	resources	for	development.	Whereas	
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the	 savings	 component	 of	 traditional	microfinance	 is	 geared	
generally	towards	livelihood	activities,	the	social	and	financial	
implications	of	SDI	daily	 savings	 are	much	more	political.11	
Another	 activity,	 known	as	 “enumeration,”	 is	 the	practice	of	
community-led	information	gathering,	which	builds	the	capacity	
within	poor	communities	to	engage	with	formal	actors,	often	the	
State,	around	planning	and	policy	implementation	in	slum	areas.	
This	activity	is,	similarly,	about	bringing	communities	together	
around	information	in	their	own	community	to	achieve	political	
leverage.12
Social	movements	cover	a	wide	 range	of	 forms	and	pur-
poses.	 More	 traditional	 social	 movements,	 including	 those	
involved	in	liberation	struggles,	are	fundamentally	opposed	to	
the	State.	They	contest	the	State	in	the	courts	and	in	the	streets.	
A	 liberation	or	 revolution-oriented	 social	movement,	 aims	 to	
overthrow	 the	State.	Other	 social	movements	 are	 focused	on	
resisting	dispossession,	and	therefore	mainly	pursue	challenges	
in	the	courts.	These	cases	tend	to	demand	that	the	State	be	the	
sole	provider	of	solutions	to	socio-economic	problems.	Under	
such	a	framework,	people’s	movements	may	be	effective	tools	
for	advocacy,	but	the	poor	remain	passive	constituencies	waiting	
for	services	to	be	delivered	from	above.
SDI-affiliated	groups	move	beyond	 such	passivity.	They	
seek	out	partnership	with	the	State;	however,	this	partnership	
is	not	to	create	pliant	constituencies	for	government	programs.	
Instead,	 these	poor	people’s	movements	serve	 to	open	up	 the	
institutions	and	resources	of	the	State	to	participation	and	con-
trol	by	people	 themselves.	 It	 is	 a	quintessentially	bottom-up,	
reformist	agenda.	These	people’s	movements	seek	to	“co-pro-
duce”	 delivery	 of	 services	 and	 implementation	 of	 socio-eco-
nomic	guarantees	with	the	State.
Such	a	battle	is	not	just	in	the	streets,	but	also	in	the	home,	
which	is	of	course	where	it	begins.	Firstly,	SDI	federations	orga-
nize	with	women	at	the	center.	They	do	this	because	they	find	
that	women	are	equipped	 to	manage	money,	 livelihoods,	and	
family—in	short,	 the	home.	As	Rose	Molokoane,	a	 leader	of	
South	Africa’s	Federation	of	the	Urban	Poor	and	an	SDI	coordi-
nator,	often	says,	“WOMEN	stands	for	Well-Organized	Men.”13	
Secondly,	in	the	communities	in	which	SDI	federations	operate,	
the	home’s	informality	itself	is	the	fundamental	challenge	to	the	
status quo.	A	poor	person	lives	on	a	piece	of	land	in	a	city	and	
needs	to	find	a	solution	for	shelter.	The	upgrading	of	informal	
settlements	 and	 the	 livelihoods	of	 slum	dwellers	begins	with	
people	taking	action	to	erect	an	illegal	shack.	As	SDI	federations	
increasingly	demonstrate,	the	capacities	and	methodologies	for	
upgrading	lie	in	the	hands	of	those	who	have	already	begun	cre-
ating	their	own	solutions.
alTernaTIve meThods In acTIon:  
examples From cape Town and naIrobI
Against	the	threat	of	eviction	and	demolitions,	communi-
ties	have	organized	around	their	own	knowledge	capacity	to	first	
face	down	the	threat,	and	then	to	create	the	space	for	dialogue	
with	government	that	leads	to	the	upgrading	of	informal	settle-
ments	in	their	current	location	(in situ)	or	else	a	truly	negotiated	
relocation.	The	case	of	the	Joe	Slovo	community	in	the	flats	of	
Cape	Town,	South	Africa,	is	a	prime	example.	A	legal	battle	that	
lasted	several	years	succeeded	in	2009	in	staving	off	imminent	
eviction.14	Subsequently,	sustained	engagement	with	the	State	
has	only	come	about	through	the	kind	of	community	organiz-
ing	measures	used	by	SDI	federations.15	For	instance,	early	in	
2010,	the	community	completed	an	enumeration	process,	which	
surveyed	every	household	on	a	wide	range	of	social	indicators.16	
This	process	of	information	gathering	has	assisted	significantly	
in	organizing	 the	community	 to	be	strong	advocates	 for	 their	
own	priorities	as	they	negotiate	with	the	Cape	Town	metropoli-
tan	municipal	government	on	how	to	upgrade	the	settlement	in 
situ.17	As	a	result	of	this	engagement,	a	communal	toilet	block	
plan	 is	 now	 in	 the	 construction	 phase	 and	many	more	 resi-
dents	are	set	 to	be	accommodated	 in	formal	housing	 than	 the	
municipal	 government	 had	 initially	 planned.18	 Elsewhere	 in	
Cape	Town,	a	citywide	Informal	Settlement	Network	(“ISN”)	is	
partnering	with	the	metropolitan	municipal	government	to	pilot	
similar	people-led	informal	settlement	upgrades	in	at	least	ten	
settlements.19
A	 similar	 success	 story	 is	 unfolding	 in	Nairobi,	 Kenya,	
where	 the	 parastatal	 Kenya	 Railways	 Corporation	 has	 long	
desired	to	evict	many	residents	of	the	famous	railway	slums	of	
Kibera	and	Mukuru.20	The	SDI-affiliated	federation,	Muungano 
wa Wanavijiji	 (the	 Kenyan	 Homeless	 People’s	 Federation),	
organized	 residents	 to	 count	 themselves	 in	 a	massive	 house-
hold	enumeration	conducted	around	2005.21	This	enumeration	
convinced	the	railway	company	to	delay	the	eviction.22	Then,	
SDI	 facilitated	 a	 learning	 exchange	with	 an	 affiliate	 federa-
tion	in	Bombay,	India,	known	as	the	National	Slum	Dwellers	
Federation.23
The	 learning	exchange	 illustrated	 the	 Indian	 federation’s	
successful	approach	 to	 facing	down	a	similar	 threat	a	decade	
earlier.	In	the	1990s,	the	Indian	federation	had	enumerated	tens	
of	thousands	of	railway	line	slum	dwellers.24	This	enumeration	
served	as	a	community-driven	tool	for	negotiating	with	govern-
ment	about	both	the	pace	and	scale	of	relocation,	as	well	as	in	
planning	for	developments	to	accommodate	those	who	would	
be	displaced.25	In	Bombay,	the	community	enumeration	maps	
show	the	astounding	history	in	vivid	detail:	who	remained,	who	
are	waiting	to	enter	permanent	housing,	and	who	are	now	living	
in	housing	developments	that	were	designed	and	partly	built	by	
community	members	themselves.
After	visiting	 the	Bombay	 railway	 line	 through	 the	SDI-
facilitated	learning	exchange,	the	Kenya	Railways	Corporation	
agreed	that	a	new	enumeration	should	take	place	in	the	affected	
Nairobi	communities	and	 that	 it	would	 serve	as	 the	basis	 for	
similar	plans	 for	 relocation	and	 in situ	upgrading.26	The	new	
enumeration	was	completed	earlier	in	2010.27	Now	development	
plans	are	in	negotiation	with	community	members	firmly	seated	
at	 the	negotiating	table.28	This	 is	an	excellent	example	of	 the	
“co-production”	ethos.	SDI	federations	are	demonstrating	varia-
tions	on	a	theme:	in	the	cities	of	the	global	South,	there	will	be	
“nothing	for	us,	without	us.”
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These	methodologies	are	by	no	means	exhaustive.	SDI	has	
a	specific	set	of	tools	to	facilitate	processes	that	mitigate	evic-
tions	and	upscale	inclusive	processes	for	city	planning	and	basic	
service	delivery.	Other	organizations	are	also	involved	in	sup-
porting	organized	communities	of	the	poor	towards	similar	ends.	
Community-led	programs	have	fundamentally	altered	govern-
ment	policy	and	practice	on	human	settlements	 in	places	 like	
Pakistan	 (Orangi	 Pilot	 Project)29	 and	 Thailand	 (Community	
Organizations	Development	Institute).30	These	initiatives	focus	
on	the	co-management	of	finances	and	planning	between	orga-
nized	communities	and	government	institutions.
conclusIon
The	challenge	 for	civil	 society	actors	 today	 is	 to	support	
urban	poor	communities	not	just	in	their	struggles	to	fight	evic-
tions;	support	must	also	be	forthcoming	for	poor	communities’	
efforts	to	build	and	redefine	relationships	with	governments	so	
as	 to	change	the	very	 institutions	 that	have	 long	made	forced	
evictions	possible.	This	is	a	difficult	task,	fraught	with	potential	
contradictions,	 unavoidable	 setbacks,	 and	 certain	 disappoint-
ments.	But	through	these	processes,	the	people	who	populate	the	
slums	of	cities	like	Nairobi	and	Bombay,	Cape	Town	and	Lagos,	
Rio	de	Janeiro	and	Cairo	will	escape	their	all-too-frequent	status	
as	victims.	Governments	and	other	formal	actors	make	the	poor	
into	victims	when	they	forcibly	eject	them	from	their	homes	and	
destroy	their	livelihoods.	We	all	run	the	risk	of	victimizing	the	
poor	if	we	forget	that	their	solutions,	their	local	expertise,	and	
their	capacity	for	survival	and	ingenuity	will	form	the	foundation	
of	inclusive	processes	that	realize	human	rights.	It	is	their	own	
potential	that	civil	society	professionals	must	work	to	amplify	
in	order	to	change	the	troubling	global	picture	for	housing	and	
human	settlements	in	our	cities.
The	time	has	come	to	consider	how	the	rights-based	agenda	
has	revealed	its	own	limitations.	It	is	time	to	consider	how	we	
can	continue	 to	articulate	 the	 rights	 framework	 in	a	way	 that	
maintains	relevance	to	people’s	struggles.	As	the	“co-produc-
tion”	methodology	gains	increasing	acceptability	and	scale,	we	
can	think	about	socio-economic	rights	under	a	new	rubric.	There	
is	now	scope	for	conceiving	and	protecting	overarching	guaran-
tees,	such	as	the	rights	to	dignity	and	participation,	which	are	at	
the	heart	of	“co-production.”
Organized	communities	of	the	poor	are	demonstrating	that	
socio-economic	rights	cannot	be	delivered	without	new	under-
standings	of	 the	governance	 structures	 intended	 to	 guarantee	
these	rights.	State	and	non-State	professional	actors	are	there-
fore	tasked	with	opening	up	the	space	for	poor	people	to	influ-
ence	and	alter	these	institutions.	This	means	translating	informal	
practice	 into	 formal	 language	and	bridging	 the	gaps	between	
informal	and	formal	technical	expertise.	As	we	come	to	terms	
with	our	new	urban	age,	we	must	grapple	with	the	implications	
of	the	routes	we	take	to	make	change	in	the	world.	In	order	to	
move	beyond	the	limitations	of	socio-economic	rights	in	theory,	
we	are	now	tasked	with	supporting	the	developmental	method-
ologies	of	the	poor	that	turn	these	into	practice.
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